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I. INTRODUCTION
Moore’s Law generally asserts that the transistor capacity on a computer
processing unit increases exponentially over time. 1 To exemplify, in 1971, Intel’s
first microprocessor contained 2,300 transistors and was used in simple electronic
pocket calculators and by 2007 Intel was manufacturing microprocessors

 Juris Doctor Candidate, Spring 2010, Pepperdine University School of Law; B.B.A., Belmont
University, 2007. I would like to thank my family and friends for their support as well as the 2008-10
staff of The Pepperdine Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law for their excellent editorial
work.
1
60 Years of the Transistor: 1947-2007, http://www.intel.com/technology/timeline.pdf (last visited
Feb. 20, 2010).
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containing 820,000,000 transistors used in personal computers capable of nearinstantaneous worldwide communication over the Internet. 2 When the framers of
the Constitution drafted the empowering words, “To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts,”3 could they foresee such a blistering pace of innovation?
Have courts been able to maintain the balance between progress and limited
monopolies? The history supporting modern principles aimed at spurring useful
inventions is discussed in Part II of this note. 4 Then, in Parts III and IV, the facts
surrounding a business method patent are described and a decision from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit confronting fundamental questions
pertinent to the successful maintenance of the United States patent system is
explained.5 Next, the impact of that decision is analyzed in Part V. 6 Lastly, the
conclusion is set out in Part VI.7
II. BACKGROUND
Modern patents may generally be thought of as “a grant of monopoly power
by the state over the commercial exploitation of an invention for a limited period.” 8
However, precursors to patents have been even more broadly defined 9 and
understood to be the sovereign’s rights rather than property rights. 10 Drawing
similar distinctions and tracing the development of patent law has enabled the
United States Supreme Court to glean the probable intent and understandings of
bygone legislators when applying existing statutes to new issues.11
While the notion of a state grant of exclusive rights for inventions in return
for its release to the public is commonly thought to be rooted in Italy, 12 English
practices are most relevant when discussing the origins of American patent law.13
Early on, the kings of England issued charters, letters patent, and letters close. 14
These instruments were methods for the crown to conduct various affairs 15 and

2

Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
4
See infra Part II.
5
See infra Part III–IV.
6
See infra Part V.
7
See infra Part VI.
8
See Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part
1), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 697, 700 (1994).
9
Id.
10
Id. at 715.
11
See e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64–65 (1972).
12
See e.g., Walterscheid, supra note 8, at 707–15 (discussing a 1474 Venetian enactment as being
the first known patent statute).
13
See id. at 698 (“[T]he English common law relating to patents was what was best known in the
infant United States.”).
14
Id. at 700–01. Charters were recorded on Charter Rolls and date from 1199 to 1515. Id. Letters
patent were recorded on Patent Rolls and date from 1202 through the twenty-first century. Id. Letters
Close were recorded on Close Rolls and date from 1205 through the twenty-first century. Id.
15
Id. at 701 (“Initially, these documents related primarily to the royal prerogatives, the revenue of
the realm, and the various branches of foreign affairs as well as grants and confirmations of office and
privileges, pardons, charters, proclamations, and commissions.”).
3
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functioned more broadly than current American patents. 16 Akin to modern
American patents, royal grants and confirmation of privilege by letters patent were
eventually used by the crown to grant privileges to inventors concerning their
inventions. 17
Early on, charters were used to effectively create group monopolies where
members of a chartered guild had the exclusive right to produce certain goods 18 or
practice a particular craft. 19 These group monopolies were municipal or regional 20
and therefore could locally regulate economic metrics such as prices, wages,
working conditions, and quality of goods.21 However, national development reoriented economic perspectives and revealed the local chartered group monopolies
to be in contradiction to the national economic wellbeing.22 If national regulation
was the clear answer to maintaining economic wellbeing, letters patent for a
monopoly were likely a suggested instrumentality for achieving transition to a
nationalized economy.23 At the least, letters patent came to be implemented in a
national policy that was in sharp contrast to the antecedent practice of granting
local monopolies by charter.24
During the reign of Queen Elizabeth I, patents issued to create a monopoly
were rationalized by various considerations. 25 At least initially, these patents
granting monopoly were primarily issued to foster economic self-sufficiency in
England.26 This objective was promoted by issuing patents of monopoly to those
persons, regardless of nationality, who would introduce a desired trade or industry
in England.27 While patents of monopoly for inventions might arguably serve the
purpose of fostering economic self-sufficiency, Jacobus Acontius urged that
individual interests were of great concern as well. 28 Acontius petitioned to have a
monopoly for his invention because “[n]othing is more honest than that those who,
by searching, have found out things useful to the public should have some fruits of
their rights and labors, as meanwhile they abandon all other modes of gain, are at

16
Id. at 700. Moreover, charters and letters patent performed similar functions as public directives,
but differed in form. Id. Letters close were private instructions to individuals. Id.
17
Id. at 701. Modern patents can be thought of as a particular type of the early letters patent. See
F. SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 2 & n.7 (4th ed. 2008).
18
Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 2),
76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 849, 851 (1994).
19
Id.
20
Id. at 852.
21
Id. at 851.
22
Id. at 852.
23
Id. at 853.
24
Walterscheid, supra note 18, at 853–54.
25
See id. at 853–54, 870–71 (“Two reasons were typically given for the monopoly grant: (a) to
introduce new trade and industry into the realm, and (b) to serve as a means of recompensing the
patentee for the costs and risks associated with the enterprise.”). Patents issued during this time were
unique in that they were largely for grants of monopoly whereas previous patents granted privileges
only. Id. at 862–63.
26
See id. at 855–56.
27
Id. Interestingly, desired trades or industries were those that exhibited features common to
modern patents such as novelty. Id.
28
Id. at 854–55.
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much expense in experiments, and often sustain much loss.”29
Ultimately, a patent was issued to Acontius30 despite the suspect nature of
monopoly grants31 because, presumably, it was perceived to benefit England.32
Patents issued for new inventions and the importation of new industries or trades
into England were, as a general matter, favorably accepted.33
Not all Elizabethan patents of monopoly were regarded as beneficial,
however, and these came to be known as “odious monopolies.”34 For instance,
although beneficial, serious abuses occurred through patents licensing patentees to
dispense with statutes forbidding the import, export, and transportation of
particular commodities.35 A hotly contested class was patents granting the power
to supervise an existing trade or industry. 36 Lastly, in clear contravention of the
common law and highly despised were patents granted for the exclusive right to
engage in an existing trade or industry. 37 These three general categories of “odious
monopolies” were suspected of contributing to a prevalent industrial depression,38
characterized by a “hindrance to trade and manufacture, high prices, inferior
goods, and unemployment.” 39 Moreover, they often delegated the dispensing
power of the crown—effectively conferring the power of the state onto individual
patentees.40
Parliament set out to quell, through legislative enactment, the loathsome
“odious monopolies” during the November 1601 session, 41 but Queen Elizabeth I
was able to dissuade against possible parliamentary usurpation of her claimed
power to grant letters patent.42 The solution: have existing patents, but not future
ones, tried for their validity in common law courts. 43 This resolution resulted in at

29

Id. at 854. Acontius obtained a patent for his invention in 1565. Id at 855.
Walterscheid, supra note 18, at 855.
31
Id. at 862–63.
32
Id. at 852–53, 862–63.
33
Id. at 864.
34
Id. at 862–63. It has been noted that Queen Elizabeth I granted such patents not out of any actual
financial interest, but rather her frugal tendencies combined with unscrupulous court suitors were at
fault. Id. at 864–65.
35
Id. at 864.
36
Walterscheid, supra note 18, at 864.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 863.
39
Id. at 865.
40
Id. at 864. These state powers included the “right of supervision, search, seizure, and arrest of
infringers, as well as the recovery of fines or penalties for infringement.” Id.
41
Id. at 865–66. Originally, Parliament introduced a bill named “Act for the Explanation of the
Common Law in Certain Cases of Letters Patents.” Id. at 865.
42
Walterscheid, supra note 18, at 865–67. Sir Francis Bacon went before Parliament on behalf of
the queen to inform the legislature that the queen would grant patents for desirable reasons. See id.
Parliament did not consider this to be an adequate response to the atrocities created by existing
monopoly patents. Id. at 866. Elizabeth I herself abated Parliament’s anxiety in a message to the
House of Commons wherein she agreed to have her patents tried for validity in common law courts in
exchange for the bill before Parliament to be discarded. Id.
43
Id. at 866.
30
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least two notable cases: Darcy v. Allein44 and The Clothworkers of Ipswich.45 Both
of these cases noted the general invalidity of a patent granting a monopoly 46 except
where the patent was granted for a limited time and dealt with either establishing a
new trade within England 47 or the discovery of something new and useful. 48
When King James I succeeded Queen Elizabeth I the tension between the
crown and Parliament regarding the power to regulate letters patent had not been
remedied.49 Further, James I implemented a policy for granting patents that was
nearly the same as Elizabeth I’s. 50 This relative lack of change may have been the
problem as public outrage concerning “odious monopolies” continued to mount
while patent policy hung in stasis.51 In any event, King James I assented when
Parliament decided to firmly root the law of patents within what became known as
the 1623 Statute of Monopolies.52 This was the first statutory basis for patent law
in England and remained the only statutory basis for two hundred years. 53
Moreover, it was during this time that both the United States Constitution was
ratified with a provision for legislative power over patents 54 and the first American
patent statute was enacted.55
During the Constitutional Convention, James Madison of Virginia and
Charles Pinckney of South Carolina discussed the necessity of federal jurisdiction
over patents and copyrights.56 Following review by the Drafting Committee of the
Convention, their proposed provisions were merged into one provision reading,
“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.”57 Unanimously adopted without a dissenting voice,58 this
44

Id. at 867 (citing Darcy v. Allein, (1602) 72 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B.)).
Id. at 869 (citing The Clothworkers of Ipswich, (1615) 78 Eng. Rep. 147 (K.B.)).
46
Id. at 868–69 (stating, in The Clothworkers of Ipswich, that there was no power to grant
monopolies “for that is to take away free trade”).
47
Id. at 869 (quoting, from Darcy, that monopoly patents were valid “where any man by his own
charge and industry, or by his own wit or invention doth bring any new trade into the realm,” and
quoting, from The Clothworkers of Ipswich, that monopoly patents were valid “if a man hath brought in
. . . a new trade within the kingdom”).
48
Walterscheid, supra note 18, at 869 (quoting, from Darcy, that monopoly patents were valid for
“any engine tending to the furtherance of a trade that never was used before,” and quoting, from The
Clothworkers of Ipswich, that monopoly patents were valid where “a man hath made a new discovery of
any thing”).
49
See id. at 871.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 873.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 874.
54
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (ratified on June 21, 1788).
55
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790).
56
S. REP. NO. 82-1979 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2396.
57
Id. The merging of Madison’s and Pinckney’s proposed provisions is apparent after dissecting
the final provision into a copyright provision and a patent provision. Id. “[T]o promote the progress of
science by securing for limited times to authors the exclusive right to their writings” evidences the
copyright provision whereas “to promote the progress of useful arts by securing for limited times to
inventors the exclusive right to their discoveries” evidences the patent provision. Id.
58
Id.
45
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provision was engrained in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States
Constitution.59 Congress’ constitutional power to grant patent rights to inventors
was thereby established.60
Although Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 was unanimously adopted,
substantial doubts concerning the granting of patents persisted for some time. 61
The month following ratification of the Constitution, Thomas Jefferson sent a letter
from France to James Madison, “urging a Bill of Rights provision restricting
monopoly, and as against the argument that limited monopoly might serve to incite
‘ingenuity,’ he argued forcefully that ‘the benefit even of limited monopolies is too
doubtful to be opposed to that of their general suppression.’”62
In 1789 and after the Bill of Rights had been drafted, Jefferson again wrote
to Madison, this time stating he would have liked a provision allowing monopolies
for a limited term only for literature and inventions.63
Not only did statesmen privately debate the probable integrity of any system
for granting patent monopolies, but a more public discourse was under way. 64
During the first session of Congress, South Carolina Representative Aedanus
Burke presciently noted that drafting a bill upon improvements or inventions in the
useful arts would be a difficult task that would occasion a substantial measure of
discussion.65 On January 8, 1790, President George Washington contributed the
following discourse:
The advancement of agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, by all proper
means, will not, I trust, need recommendation. But I cannot forbear intimating to
you the expediency of giving effectual encouragement as well to the introduction of
new and useful inventions from abroad, as to the exertions of skill and genius in
producing them at home . . . Nor am I less persuaded that you will agree with me
in opinion, that there is nothing which can better deserve your patronage than the

59

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Id. Placement of the Patent and Copyright Clause within Article I, Section 8 specifically
identifies the provision as one of Congress’ enumerated powers. Id.; see generally McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819):
This government is acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated powers. The
principle, that it can exercise only the powers granted to it, would seem too
apparent, to have required to be enforced by all those arguments, which its
enlightened friends, while it was depending before the people, found it necessary
to urge; that principle is now universally admitted.
A corollary principle is that patents are a right created through a government grant. ROBERT L.
HARMON, PATENTS & THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 1.2 (8th ed. 2007). It must be noted that this
constitutional grant of power is also recognized as a limitation in order to prevent the inequities that
arose before the 1623 Statute of Monopolies. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
61
See Graham, 383 U.S. at 7–11 (1966) (discussing Thomas Jefferson’s critical role in debating the
propriety of patents and stating that “[t]he difficulty of formulating conditions for patentability was
heightened by the generality of the constitutional grant”).
62
Id. at 7–8 (quoting V WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 47 (Ford ed., 1895)).
63
Id. at 8 (quoting V WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113 (Ford ed., 1895)).
64
See generally Proceedings in Congress During the Years 1789 and 1790, Relating to the First
Patent and Copyright Laws, 22 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 243 (1940) (compiling documents related to the first
congressional proceedings).
65
Id. at 259.
60
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promotion of science and literature.66

Washington approved and signed the Patent Act of 1790 three months later on
April 10, 1790, creating the first American patent legislation. 67
The debate continued. Expressing a substantial change in thought from
earlier letters to James Madison, Jefferson wrote to Oliver Evans in 1807 that
“[c]ertainly an inventor ought to be allowed a right to the benefit of his invention
for some certain time. . . . Nobody wishes more than I do that ingenuity should
receive a liberal encouragement.”68 In an 1813 letter to Isaac McPherson,
Jefferson elaborated on his philosophy of patent monopolies. 69 He understood that
people cannot naturally own a property right of exclusion in the ideas of their
invention because, once made known to the public, information spreads freely
from person to person.70 Therefore, Jefferson concluded that patent monopolies
are only born by society’s recognition that exclusive rights encourage the pursuit
of useful ideas.71 With one issue rested, another arose: When does the benefit to
the public justify “the embarrassment of an exclusive patent[?]”72 Offering one
line of thought, Jefferson argued that patents should only be granted for ideas of
relatively high utility.73 These letters to Mr. Evans and Mr. McPherson came after
Jefferson had experience as a member on the patent board and drafter of the 1793
Patent Act.74
Despite the ongoing debates concerning patent policy, relatively minor
changes were made to the Patent Act of 1790 until a substantial revision occurred
with the Patent Act of 1870.75 And although the current Patent Act of 1952 has
been considered the second substantial revision, 76 the provisions concerning
patent-eligible subject matter appear to have undergone only minor changes. The
Patent Act of 1790 provided that “any person or persons . . . . setting forth that he,
she or they hath or have invented or discovered any useful art[s], manufacture[s],
engine[s], machine[s], device[s], or any improvement[s] therein . . . . [may be
granted a patent].”77 And where “art” has the same meaning as “process,” 78 the
current Patent Act of 1952 provides little variation in its provision that “[w]hoever
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 79
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Id. at 253–54.
Id. at 276.
Graham, 383 U.S. at 8 (quoting V WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 75–76 (Washington ed.)).
Id. at 8–9 & n.2 (quoting VI WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 180–81 (Washington ed.)).
Id. (quoting VI WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 180–81 (Washington ed.)).
Id. (quoting VI WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 180–81 (Washington ed.)).
See id. at 9.
Id. at 9–10 & n.3 (quoting VI WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 180-81 (Washington ed.)).
Graham, 383 U.S. at 9–10 (1966).
S. REP. NO. 82-1979 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2397.
Id.
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790).
35 U.S.C. § 100 (2000).
Id. § 101.
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Under the Patent Act of 1952, modern American patent grants are recognized
as property rights of exclusion. 80 Generally, a patent grant affords the patentee
“the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, or offering to sell the
patented invention in the United States, or importing the invention.” 81 However,
this right to exclude is for a limited term and generally lasts for seventeen to
twenty years depending on particular dates of issue and application.82
Additionally, a patentee may license his or her patent to others.83 If a party takes
action in contradiction to any right held by a patentee, a constitutional injury has
occurred,84 and the injured patentee’s remedies may be for damages, costs,
attorney fees,85 and injunction.86 However, the government has the power of
eminent domain to deprive a patentee of his or her patent rights.87 These general
rights and remedies create the opportunity for a patentee to exercise a limited
monopoly in order to obtain economic advantages. 88 The following case
implicates currently held patent rights as well as potential patent rights as it raises a
fundamental question not altogether clear from the current Patent Act of 1952 and
relevant case law: What is capable of being patented?
III. FACTS
Bernard L. Bilski and Rand A. Warsaw (collectively, “Applicants”) filed a
patent application entitled “Energy Risk Management Method” on April 10,
1997.89 The application set out eleven claims, the first reading:
A method for managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by a
commodity provider at a fixed price comprising the steps of:
(a) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and
consumers of said commodity wherein said consumers purchase said
commodity at a fixed rate based upon historical averages, said fixed rate
corresponding to a risk position of said consumer;
(b) identifying market participants for said commodity having a counter-risk
position to said consumers; and

80
HARMON, supra note 60, §1.1(a) (“It is beyond reasonable debate that patents are property . . .
.”). To be sure, the Patent and Copyright Clause affords the grant to inventors of an “exclusive Right to
their . . . Discoveries[,]” U.S. CONST art. I, § 8, cl. 8, and the right to exclude is the hallmark of
property. HARMON, supra note 60, §1.1(a).
81
HARMON, supra note 60, §1.1(a) (Supp. 2008).
82
Id. §1.1(a) (8th ed. 2007).
83
Id.
84
Id. §1.1(a) (Supp. 2008).
85
Id. §1.1(a) n.25 (8th ed. 2007).
86
Id.
87
HARMON, supra note 60, §1.1(a).
88
Id.
89
Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, 2006 WL 5738364, n.1 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006). The patent
was filed exactly 207 years after President George Washington signed the 1790 Patent Act.
Proceedings in Congress During the Years 1789 and 1790, Relating to the First Patent and Copyright
Laws, 22 J. J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 243, 276 (1940).
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(c) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and
said market participants at a second fixed rate such that said series of market
participant transactions balances the risk position of said series of consumer
transactions.90

Generally, this first claim describes a method for hedging risk associated
with commodities trading.91 Claims two through eleven delimit the broad first
claim.92 The particular consumption risk sought to be managed is weather-related
price risk and the commodity involved is energy.93 Moreover, the transactions
involving commodities are not limited to sales and may also consist of options for
the right to purchase the commodity at a fixed price during a defined timeframe. 94
The subject matter of the patent can be illustrated by an example of parties
having different interests in coal.95 Changes in the weather can change how much
coal a power company will need for producing electricity based upon increases and
decreases in the amount of power customers need for heating and air conditioning.
If the demand and price of coal increases due to weather, the power company
suffers while the coal mining company that supplies the coal benefits, and vice
versa if the demand and price decrease.96 Patent protection was claimed for the
method of establishing an intermediary party who sells coal to the power company
at one fixed price and buys coal from the mining company at a second fixed
price.97 Adverse, as well as beneficial, weather-related changes in coal prices for
the power and mining companies are thereby eliminated and uncertainty is
minimized.98 Moreover, the commodity provider has hedged against uncertainty
because increases in demand and price mean that it has sold coal at a
disadvantageous price but has bought coal at an advantageous price, and vice versa
if demand and price decrease.99
Each of Bilski and Warsaw’s eleven claims were rejected under 35 U.S.C. §
101 by the patent examiner because “the invention is not implemented on a
specific apparatus and merely manipulates [an] abstract idea and solves a purely
mathematical problem without any limitation to a practical application, therefore,
the invention is not directed to the technological arts.” 100 The Applicants appealed
and the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“Board”) found the examiner
erred insofar as any technological arts or specific apparatus tests were applied. 101
Applying a transformation test did not save the claims either because the Board

90
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (quoting ‘892 application cl.1), cert.
granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (No. 08-964, 2009 Term).
91
Id.
92
Ex parte Bilski, 2006 WL 5738364.
93
Id.
94
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 950.
95
See id. at 949–50.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 950.
98
See id. at 949–50.
99
Id. at 950.
100
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
101
Id.
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concluded that transforming non-physical financial risks was not a patent-eligible
process.102 Moreover, the Board found the claims were not patent-eligible because
they only claimed an abstract idea and did not satisfy the “useful, concrete and
tangible result” test.103
Bilski and Warsaw appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”).104 Their argument that the examiner and the
Board arrived at erroneous decisions regarding patent-eligibility under § 101 was
originally presented before a Federal Circuit panel on October 1, 2007.105 Before
disposition, however, an en banc review was ordered and oral argument was again
heard on May 8, 2008.106 The Federal Circuit affirmed the conclusion that the
Applicants’ claims were not patent-eligible.107
IV. OPINION ANALYSIS
A. Majority Opinion
Chief Judge Michel wrote for the majority, 108 discussing the nettlesome issue
of what is patent-eligible under § 101109 – a threshold issue that determines when a
patent may issue regardless of the possibility that all other conditions of
patentability have been satisfied.110 However, a patent examiner is not required to
address § 101 patent-eligibility before rejecting an application on other grounds. 111
Because there was no dispute upon the meaning of the claims, the court strictly
focused on whether the claims were patent-eligible within the meaning of § 101.112
There was no dispute that the claimed invention sought protection as a
“process” under § 101.113 The court noted that if it were not for intervening
Supreme Court decisions, the claims at issue would meet the definition of
“process” as was originally understood under the 1952 Patent Act. 114 Specifically,
the broad ordinary meaning of “process”—“[a] procedure, . . . [a] series of actions,
motions, or operations definitely conducing to an end, whether voluntary or
involuntary”—had been constricted.115
Various Supreme Court cases were discussed by the court as standing for the
102

Id.
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 949.
106
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
107
Id.
108
Id. The Chief Judge was joined by Circuit Judges Lourie, Schall, Bryson, Gajarsa, Linn, Dyk,
and Prost. Id.
109
See id. at 949–66.
110
Id. at 950–51.
111
Id. at n.1.
112
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 951 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
113
Id.
114
See id. at 951–52.
115
See id. (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
1972 (2d ed. 1952)).
103
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rule that a patent applicant cannot claim a fundamental principle or mental process
even if the claim can literally be understood as a process.116 The court specified
that fundamental processes consist of laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas.117 Processes that fit these categories are patent-ineligible because
they are basic foundations of knowledge that must be free to all persons.118
Logically, determining when an applicant claims a fundamental principle or mental
process is difficult because inventions must incorporate and rely on these
foundations of human knowledge.119 The court turned to the Supreme Court cases
of Gottschalk v. Benson and Diamond v. Diehr for guidance.120
From Benson, the court considered significant the Supreme Court’s analysis
that where a patent applicant’s claims cover all uses of an abstract idea, the
practical effect of granting the patent would be an improper monopoly on the idea
itself.121 Elaborating on this analysis, the court identified a critical distinction that
was made in Diehr: Despite the fact that claims may incorporate or rely on a
fundamental principle, a particular application of the fundamental principle would
not be improper because such a patent would not operate to preempt all uses of the
fundamental principle or mental process. 122 The court thus concluded that whether
a patent was improperly drawn to a fundamental principle was a matter of
determining to what degree a patent applicant’s claims would exclude others from
a fundamental principle. 123 However, the court was not clear in explaining what
degree of exclusion was improper124 or whether mental processes should be
examined under the same preemption analysis.125
Despite any ambiguity in the preemption analysis, the court claimed that the
Supreme Court had “enunciated a definitive test to determine whether a process
claim is tailored narrowly enough to encompass only a particular application of a
fundamental principle rather than to pre-empt the principle itself.”126 The court
called this test the “machine-or-transformation test” and stated it as follows: “A
claimed process is surely patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a particular

116
Id. at 952 (citing Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948); Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175
(1981); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1852)).
117
Id. at 952 & n.4.
118
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 952 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
119
See Diehr, 450 U.S. at n.12 (“[A]ll inventions can be reduced to underlying principles of
nature.”).
120
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 952–54.
121
Id. at 953–54.
122
Id. at 952–53.
123
Id. at 953.
124
See id. at 954 (stating the degree of exclusion to be either preemption of “substantially all uses
of [a] fundamental principle” or preemption of “all uses of a fundamental principle”).
125
See id. at 952–54 (stating that “[t]he true issue before us then is whether Applicants are seeking
to claim a fundamental principle (such as an abstract idea) or a mental process,” but arriving at a
modified notion that “[t]he question before us then is whether Applicants’ claim recites a fundamental
principle and, if so, whether it would pre-empt substantially all uses of that fundamental principle if
allowed”).
126
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The court noted that this test was “articulated
in Benson and reaffirmed in Diehr.” Id. at 955.
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machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state
or thing.”127 Under the machine branch of this test, the court rationalized that “[a]
claimed process involving a fundamental principle that uses a particular machine
or apparatus would not pre-empt uses of the principle that do not also use the
specified machine or apparatus in the manner claimed.” 128 And under the
transformation branch of this test, the court reasoned that:
[A] claimed process that transforms a particular article to a specified different state
or thing by applying a fundamental principle would not pre-empt the use of the
principle to transform any other article, to transform the same article but in a
manner not covered by the claim, or to do anything other than transform the
specified article.129

Next, the court addressed the arguments from Applicants and various amici
concerning whether the machine-or-transformation test was the sole test governing
analysis of process patents under § 101.130 The court conceded that in Benson—
the first case of the Supreme Court’s trilogy discussing patent eligibility under §
101—the Court was equivocal in establishing any machine-or-transformation
test.131 This fact is fairly odd because Benson unequivocally rejected the argument
that a process patent must be either tied to a machine or transform an article. 132
Further, the court recognized the statement in Flook that “we assume that a valid
process patent may issue even if it does not meet [the machine-or-transformation
test].”133 The court apparently thought the assumptive nature of the statement was
evidence of equivocalness rather than suspicion that such cases would be rare.
Finally, the Court in Diehr, the last case of the trilogy, stated that “[t]ransformation
and reduction of an article ‘to a different state or thing’ is the clue to the
patentability of a process claim that does not include particular machines.” 134
Because this “clue” is similar to the machine-or-transformation test and there was
no statement in Diehr that it was not the sole test of patent-eligibility for process
patents under § 101, the court inferred that the machine-or-transformation test was
rendered the sole test for such determinations. 135 In circular fashion, the court
concluded that their reliance on “the Supreme Court’s machine-or-transformation
test” was acceptable.136
127
128
129
130
131
132

Id. at 954.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 955–56.
Id. at 956.
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
It is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a particular machine or
apparatus or must operate to change articles or materials to a ‘different state or
thing.’ We do not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet
the requirements of our prior precedents.

Id.
133
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 956 (alteration in original) (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589
(1978)).
134
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981) (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 70).
135
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 956.
136
Id. (“Therefore, we believe our reliance on the Supreme Court’s machine-or-transformation test
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Two requirements of the machine-or-transformation test were then explained
by the court.137 First, Diehr stated that § 101 “cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.”138 This holding was interpreted to mandate that no potential
process patent that merely claims a fundamental principle or mental process may
become patentable by limiting its application to a particular field-of-use.139 The
court noted that this is not contrary to the aforementioned preemption analysis
undergirding the machine-or-transformation test because “pre-emption is merely
an indication that a claim seeks to cover a fundamental principle itself rather than
only a specific application of that principle.” 140 Moreover, the court stated, “Preemption of all uses of a fundamental principle in all fields and pre-emption of all
uses of the principle in only one field both indicate that the claim is not limited to a
particular application of the principle.”141 It was summarily concluded that
satisfying the machine-or-transformation test necessarily satisfies the requirement
in Diehr.142
Second, the court discussed Diehr’s statement that “insignificant postsolution activity will not transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable
process.”143 This finding built upon the idea in Flook that “[t]he notion that postsolution activity . . . can transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable
process exalts form over substance.”144 The Court in Flook provided an example:
“A competent draftsman could attach some form of post-solution activity to almost
any mathematical formula; the Pythagorean theorem would not have been
patentable, or partially patentable, because a patent application contained a final
step indicating that the formula, when solved, could be usefully applied to existing
surveying techniques.”145
Tension arises when it is remembered that fundamental principles and mental
processes will exist in all patents to some degree.146 Does this mean that
significant post-solution activities may transform fundamental principles into a
patentable process? If fundamental principles and mental processes are always
patent-ineligible,147 is the post-solution activity rule superfluous?
The court also discussed other considerations in an effort to clarify the limits
of § 101.148 First noted was the Supreme Court’s holding in Diehr that § 101 does
not require examination of whether an applicant’s claims recite any new or obvious

as the applicable test for § 101 analyses of process claims is sound.”).
137
Id. at 957.
138
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191.
139
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 957.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id. (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92).
144
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978).
145
Id.
146
See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
147
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
148
See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 958.
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subject matter because these statutory requirements are governed only by 35
U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103.149 Second, the Court in Diehr explained that “under § 101,
[an applicant’s] claims must be considered as a whole . . . [and] it is inappropriate
to dissect the claims.”150 Diehr recognized that “[t]his is particularly true in a
process claim because a new combination of steps in a process may be patentable
even though all the constituents of the combination [might be patentineligible].”151
In section III, the court reviewed its own prior cases and others from its
predecessor, the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, which
followed the Supreme Court’s patent-eligibility cases.152 It was claimed that these
decisions provided “a wealth of detailed guidance and helpful examples on how to
determine the patent-eligibility of process claims” because they discussed
technologies unimaginable at the time the Supreme Court decided its trilogy of
patent-eligibility cases. 153 However, the court began by rejecting two § 101 tests
promulgated by at least six prior decisions.154
Three cases from the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals—In re Freeman,
In re Walter, and In re Abele—developed the now-defunct Freeman-Walter-Abele
test.155 The court stated the two-step test as follows: “(1) determining whether the
claim recites an ‘algorithm’ within the meaning of Benson, then (2) determining
whether that algorithm is ‘applied in any manner to physical elements or process
steps.’”156 After noting a possible argument that the test may conflict with the
holistic claim construction rule,157 the court invalidated the test.158
Another three cases—In re Alappat, State Street Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Financial Group Inc., and AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc.—
stood for the “useful, concrete and tangible result” inquiry. 159 The court noted that
this test was related to the machine-or-transformation test, but it “was certainly
never intended to supplant the Supreme Court’s test.” 160 As a result, the test was
invalidated.161
149

Id. (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188–91 (1981)).
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188.
151
Id. Therefore, post-solution activity must be analyzed with regard to all claims made by a patent
applicant rather than any individual post-solution step. See supra text accompanying notes 143–46.
152
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 958.
153
Id.
154
Id. at 958–60.
155
Id. at 958–59 (citing In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758
(C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).
156
Id. at 959 (citing In re Abele, 684 F.2d at 905–07).
157
See supra notes 150–51 and accompanying text. The court also cited In re Grams for the
proposition a claim might be patent-eligible despite the Freeman-Walter-Abele test. In re Bilski, 545
F.3d at 959 (citing In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 838–39 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). However, the court later
acknowledged In re Grams’s reliance on the Freeman-Walter-Abele test. Id. at n.17.
158
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959.
159
Id. (citing In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Fin. Group Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998); AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352
(Fed. Cir 1999)).
160
Id.
161
Id. at 959–60.
150
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Without citing any specific decisions, the court then addressed a call from
some amici curiae to adopt a technological arts test.162 Such a test would require
claims drafted to some sort of technological art. 163 The court stated that a
technological arts test would be inherently vague because “the terms ‘technological
arts’ and ‘technology’ are both ambiguous and ever-changing.”164 Ultimately, this
type of test was not adopted by the court because a technological arts test had
never before been explicitly adopted by the court, its predecessor, or the Supreme
Court.165
Supporting one aspect of State Street, the court reaffirmed its decision not to
create any categorical exclusion beyond fundamental principles. 166 Under State
Street, the court rejected the categorical exclusion of business methods from § 101
eligibility because business methods are “subject to the same legal requirements
for patentability as applied to any other process or method.”167 Moreover, the
court declined to create a categorical exclusion regarding computer software.168
After sorting out the above issues, the court reexamined the facts of prior
cases in order to elaborate on the machine-or-transformation test. 169 However, the
court first restricted its discussion with an eye toward the facts presently before
it.170 This approach focused solely on the transformation branch of the machineor-transformation test because the Applicants had admitted their first claim did not
tie any step of their process to a machine or apparatus. 171 Therefore, the question
of § 101 patent eligibility was first narrowed to whether the central purpose of the
claimed process was to transform an article into a different state or thing. 172
Looking to Benson, the court honed in on the Supreme Court’s statement that
“chemical process[es] or the physical acts which transform . . . raw material are . . .
sufficiently definite to confine the patent monopoly within rather definite
bounds.”173 This proposition first meant that the transformation of an article must
give the patentee’s monopoly “meaningful limits.”174 Next, it classified physical
objects or substances as “articles,” which may be the focus of a patent eligible

162

Id. at 960.
Id. at n.21.
164
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir.
1998), abrogated in part by Bilski, 545 F.3d 943.
168
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 960, n.23. The court noted that it would not be helpful to discuss computer
software patent-eligibility because the facts before the court involved no computer software. Id.
169
Id. at 961.
170
Id. at 962.
171
Id. This is a somewhat odd analysis because the court had recognized the impropriety of
dissecting an applicant’s claims when applying a § 101 analysis. See supra notes 150–51 and
accompanying text. However, the court already noted this was not a case of claim construction,
and the patent examiner found that none of the Applicants’ claims were tied to an apparatus. See
supra notes 100, 112 and accompanying text.
172
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962.
173
Id. (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972)).
174
Id at 961.
163
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physical or chemical transformation. 175 The critical issue of the transformation test
thus became “what sorts of things constitute ‘articles’ such that their
transformation is sufficient to impart patent-eligibility under § 101.”176
Arriving at an issue sure to become paramount, the Federal Circuit
confronted whether “articles” could be electronic signals, electronic data, legal
obligations, organizational relationships, or business risks. 177 The court found that
a broadly stated process of visually displaying data would be patent-ineligible, but
a process transforming data about a specific physical object or substance into a
visual display could be patent-eligible.178 Moreover, the underlying physical
object or substance need not be transformed “[s]o long as the claimed process is
limited to a practical application of a fundamental principle to transform specific
data, and . . . there is no danger that the scope of the claim would wholly pre-empt
all uses of the principle.”179 However, the court found that mere data gathering
usually will not transform any article and the mere addition of a data gathering step
cannot transform an algorithm into a patent-eligible process. 180 The court was less
than clear when it stated that “the inherent step of gathering data can also fairly be
characterized as insignificant extra-solution activity” because it is incongruous to
identify an inherent step of a process as an activity that is insignificant or extrasolution.181
In section IV, the majority applied the machine or transformation test to the
facts of the case.182 Expounding further on the metes and bounds of patent-eligible
process claims, the court held that transformations of “public or private legal
obligations or relationships, business risks, or other such abstractions” cannot
satisfy the machine-or-transformation test because “they are not physical objects or
substances, and they are not representative of physical objects or substances.”183
The court explained that Bilski and Warsaw’s process of trading commodities was
merely an exchange of legal rights that could only amount to abstract mental and
mathematical processes.184 And even if the trading was limited to the specific
process of hedging consumable commodities, the effective pre-emption of such a
fundamental concept would at least require the impermissible pre-emption of an
entire field-of-use.185 Therefore, the process was not statutory subject matter
because it failed to meet the machine-or-transformation test and the BPAI was
accordingly affirmed. 186

175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186

Id. at 962.
Id.
Id. at 962.
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962–63 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 963.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 963–64.
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 964–65 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 966.
Id. at 964–66.
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B. Mayer Dissent
Judge Mayer dissented from the majority’s failure to overrule State Street
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. and AT&T Corp. v. Excel
Communications, Inc. on the ground that business methods should be categorically
excluded from the scope of patent-eligible subject matter.187 First, Judge Mayer
argued that history likely lent no support to the constitutionality of business
method patents because the Framers were familiar with the English Statute of
Monopolies that restricted the Crown’s ability to grant “monopolies to court
favorites in goods or businesses which had long before been enjoyed by the
public,”188 and therefore “consciously acted to bar Congress from granting letters
patent in particular types of business.”189 Key to Judge Mayer’s constitutional
argument is that the term “useful arts” in Article I, Section 8 equates to the modern
term “technology” and that Congress does not have the power to allow patents for
business methods because these methods “are not directed to any technological or
scientific innovation.”190 Moreover, Judge Mayer argued that when the current
1952 Patent Act was enacted Congress intended to promote the case law that stood
for the proposition that business methods are ineligible for patent protection. 191
After reviewing the possible evils of business method patents, 192 Judge Mayer
concluded that the majority’s machine-or-transformation test was an insufficient
method for determining patent-eligibility and asserted a technological arts test
asking whether claims are drawn to the natural sciences. 193
C. Rader Dissent
Judge Rader dissented because the majority “link[ed] patent eligibility to the
age of iron and steel at a time of subatomic particles and terabytes.194 Specifically,
Judge Rader’s opinion regarded the machine-or-transformation test as an
amalgamation of Supreme Court dicta 195 that raised more problems than it
solved196 and hindered innovation in increasingly ethereal technologies. 197 For
these reasons, Judge Rader concluded that the Patent Act sets a broad standard for
statutory subject matter under § 101198 and the present claims were patentineligible because they sought to monopolize an abstract idea.199

187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199

Id. at 998 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
Id. (emphasis added) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966)).
Id. (emphasis added) (citing In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 999–1000.
Id. at 1004–08 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1008–11.
Id. at 1011 (Rader, J., dissenting).
Id.
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1015 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1012.
Id. at 1011.

356

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW

Vol. III:II

D. Newman Dissent
Judge Newman decried the majority for contravening the Patent Act, 200
contravening precedent,201 and contravening the Constitution.202 Further, Judge
Newman reasoned that neither the early English Statute of Monopolies 203 nor the
English common law204 limited the § 101 term “process” in the manner the
majority reasoned.205 After recognizing that the Patent Act contains other
provisions regarding novelty, obviousness, and specification that could more
properly preclude or permit a patent for Bilski’s claimed invention, Judge Newman
concluded that the majority had improperly created an unpredictable standard that
cast present and future patent rights into doubt and undermined the policy of
spurring innovation.206
E. Dyk & Linn Concurrence
The concurring opinion joined fully with the majority opinion and wrote
separately to rebut the assertion in the dissents from Judges Rader and Newman
that the majority had “usurp[ed] the legislative role” by straying from the scope of
patent-eligibility under § 101.207 Analyzing the legislative history of the current
patent act, the concurring judges ascribed various principles from the English
Statute of Monopolies and English case law to the first couple American Patent
Acts.208 The concurring opinion concluded that early American patent law did not
support claims for “organizing human activity” such as Bilski and Warsaw’s
claims and that there has been no intervening change that would render these
claims patent-eligible.209
V. IMPACT
A. Direct Impact
1. Post-Bilski Federal Circuit Decisions
By January 1, 2010, four Federal Circuit decisions relying on Bilski had
issued. In Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec, the court exemplified
three patent-ineligible biotechnology claims, one covering natural phenomena and
the other two covering insignificant post-solution activity.210 Next, the Federal

200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210

Id. at 976 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Id.
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Newman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 985.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 995–98 (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112).
Id. at 966 (Dyk & Linn, JJ., concurring).
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 966–72 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Dyk & Linn, JJ., concurring).
Id. at 972–76.
Nos. 2006-1634, 2006-1649, 2008 WL 5273107 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 19, 2008).
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Circuit differentiated between business method claims that are patent-ineligible for
reciting mere mental processes and business method claims involving computers
that come closer to passing the machine prong of the machine-or-transformation
test in In re Comiskey.211 Defining abstract ideas under § 101, the court, in In re
Ferguson, found claims related to a marketing business method to be patentineligible.212 Lastly, the Federal Circuit found biotechnology-related claims
patent-eligible for their transformative nature despite close ties to patent-ineligible
mental processes in Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative
Services.213
The non-precedential Federal Circuit opinion Classen Immunotherapies, Inc.
v. Biogen Idec summarily affirmed the invalidation of multiple biotechnology
patents because they neither tied a process to a machine nor transformed a specific
article into a different state or thing. 214 The lower court described three of
Classen’s patents at issue as “methods for evaluating and improving the safety of
immunization schedules.”215 Each of the patents was held by the lower court to
claim patent-ineligible subject matter for claiming a natural phenomenon described
as “an inquiry of the extent of the proposed correlation between vaccines and
chronic disorders.”216 Moreover, two of the patents included a step of immunizing
patients pursuant to a low-risk schedule, which was held to be insignificant postsolution activity.217
Vacating its previous 2007 decision decided upon obviousness principles
under 35 U.S.C. § 103218 and issuing, over dissent, a revised version decided upon
wholly new § 101 grounds, 219 the Federal Circuit in In re Comiskey held multiple
claims patent-ineligible and remanded other claims to the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (“PTO”).220 The first group of claims discussed by the court
described a method for resolving unilateral and contractual document disputes
through mandatory arbitration.221 These claims were found patent-ineligible
because they were drawn to mental processes and sought to monopolize human
intelligence itself.222 However, the second group of claims discussed by the court
recited an arbitration module, arbitration system, and arbitration database.223 This

211

No. 2006-1286, 2009 WL 162408 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 26, 2009).
558 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
213
581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
214
Classen, 2008 WL 5273107, at *1.
215
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec, No. WDQ-04-2607, 2006 WL 6161856, at *1
(D. Md. Aug. 16, 2006).
216
Id. at *5.
217
Id.
218
In re Comiskey, 499 F. 3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
219
Order on Petition for Rehearing En Banc, In re Comiskey, No. 2006-1286, 2009 U.S. App.
Lexis 400, at *1–2 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 13, 2009).
220
In re Comiskey, No. 2006-1286, 2009 WL 162408, at *11 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 26, 2009).
221
Id. at *10.
222
Id. The court noted that the applicant had conceded that these claims neither required a machine
nor described a process of manufacture or process to alter the composition of matter, closely tracking
the machine-or-transformation test. Id.
223
Id.
212
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second group of claims was limited “wherein access to the mandatory arbitration is
established through the Internet, intranet, World Wide Web, software applications,
telephone, television, cable, video [or radio], magnetic, electronic communication,
or other communications means.”224 Finding that this second group of claims
could, under the broadest reasonable interpretation, require the use of a machine,
the Federal Circuit remanded to the PTO to consider whether the second group of
claims recited statutory subject matter under § 101.225
In In re Ferguson, the Federal Circuit held claims reciting a method relating
to a collective marketing regimen for computer software companies patentineligible.226 While the method claims were tied to a “marketing force,” the court
concluded that the claims still failed the machine prong of the machine-ortransformation test because no “concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain
devices and combination of devices” existed.227 Those claims, the court found,
also failed the transformation prong because they merely organized business or
legal relationships.228 Other “paradigm claims” were similarly held patentineligible for failure to fit within any one of the four § 101 categories.229 Circuit
Judge Newman filed a concurring opinion stating that the majority improperly
expanded upon Bilski by defining abstract ideas as anything that does not meet the
machine-or-transformation test.230
Providing contrast to Classen, the Federal Circuit unanimously reversed an
invalidation of biotechnology patents in Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo
Collaborative Services.231 The two patents at issue concerned two different
autoimmune disease drugs to be used within similar methods of calculating
dosages for optimal therapeutic efficacy. 232 While the lower court found these
patents invalid for claiming “natural correlations and data-gathering steps,” the
Federal Circuit explained that “methods of treatment . . . are always transformative
when a defined group of drugs is administered to the body to ameliorate the effects
of an undesired condition.”233 Regardless of whether the above explanation was
meant as a per se rule under the transformation prong, the Federal Circuit advanced
the following grounds for finding patent-eligibility: (1) the patents recited
transformative claims because the diagnostic processes required both the
transformation of drugs into metabolites within the human body and the
transformation of human tissue samples into non-human samples;234 (2) the

224

Id.
Id. at *11.
226
558 F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
227
Id. at 1363–64 (quoting In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
228
Id. at 1364.
229
Id. at 1365–66.
230
Id. at 1366–68 (Newman, J., concurring).
231
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2009). It
should be remembered that while viewing Prometheus alongside Classen may provide contrast of
certain concepts, Classen remains a non-precedential opinion. See supra note 214 and accompanying
text.
232
Prometheus Labs., 581 F.3d at 1339–40.
233
Id. at 1346.
234
Id. at 1345–47.
225
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patents’ data gathering steps were neither “mere data-gathering” steps nor
“insignificant extra-solution activity” because those steps were central to the
purpose of medical diagnosis;235 and (3) the patents’ final mental step of producing
a particular medical warning was innocuous because “[a] subsequent mental step
does not, by itself, negate the transformative nature of prior steps.” 236
2. Petition for Writ of Certiorari
On January 28, 2009, a petition for certiorari was filed on behalf of
petitioners Bernard L. Bilski and Rand A. Warsaw. 237 The first question presented
to the Court reads:
Whether the Federal Circuit erred by holding that a “process” must be tied to a
particular machine or apparatus, or transform a particular article into a different
state or thing (“machine-or-transformation” test), to be eligible for patenting under
§ 101, despite this Court’s precedent declining to limit the broad statutory grant of
patent eligibility for “any” new and useful process beyond excluding patents for
“laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.”238

The second question reads: “Whether the Federal Circuit’s ‘machine-ortransformation’ test for patent eligibility, which effectively forecloses meaningful
patent protection to many business methods, contradicts the clear Congressional
intent that patents protect ‘method[s] of doing or conducting business.’” 239
Certiorari was granted on June 1, 2009.240
3. Supreme Court Briefs
a. Brief for Petitioners
The Brief for Petitioners can be reasonably broken down into four main
arguments.241 Within the first main argument, petitioners asserted that the
machine-or-transformation test conflicts with statutory and case authority
establishing that the scope of § 101 is broad. 242 The second main argument
proposed that the Patent Act recognizes the patent-eligibility of business methods
within 35 U.S.C. § 273.243 Third, petitioners argued that the Court should
recognize a practical application test for patents involving fundamental
principles.244 Lastly, petitioners’ fourth argument alleged that Bilski’s claims at

235
236
237

Id. at 1343, 1347–48.
Id. at 1348–50.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bilski v. Doll, No. 08-964, 2009 WL 226501 (U.S. filed Jan. 28,

2009).
238

Id. at *i.
Id.
240
Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009).
241
See Brief for Petitioners at iii–vi, Bilski v. Doll, No. 08-964, 2009 WL 2372921 (U.S. filed July
30, 2009).
242
See id.
243
See id.
244
See id.
239
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issue are patent-eligible when analyzed under the averred proper framework for §
101 process inventions.245
While partly enabling the ultimate conclusion of patent-eligibility,
petitioners’ first main argument that § 101 is more broad in scope than the
machine-or-transformation test permits is also critical for understanding how the
legal system should promote the policies underlying the Patent Act. 246 Petitioners
began by identifying statutory support in the expansive words of § 101 that “any
new and useful process” is patent-eligible247 in order to foster human
innovations.248 Juxtaposing the words of the statute with steadfast Supreme Court
support for an expansive reading of the statute 249 enabled petitioners to argue that
the Federal Circuit has not only flouted two express denials of the machine-ortransformation test,250 but has also intruded into the ambit of the legislature. 251
Corollary to the above, petitioners noted that the rigid and limiting qualities of the
machine-or-transformation test disrupt inventors’ settled expectations of what is
patent-eligible252 and disrupt how other sections of the Patent Act were meant to
operate within the statutory scheme. 253

245

See id.
See id. at 18–28, 37–42.
247
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 241, at 18–19, 26–28 (emphasis added) (quoting 35 U.S.C. §
101). “[T]he Court has also been informed by congressional intent that statutory subject matter
‘include[s] anything under the sun that is made by man.’” Id. at 19 (quoting S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 5
(1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399; H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).
248
Id. at 26–28 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316 (1980) (“Congress employed
broad general language in drafting § 101 precisely because . . . inventions are often unforeseeable.”)).
249
Id. at 19–20 (citing J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 130
(2001) (“As this Court recognized over 20 years ago in Chakrabarty, the language of § 101 is extremely
broad.”); Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308 (“Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be
given wide scope.”)).
250
Id. at 20–21 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1971):
It is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a particular machine or
apparatus or must operate to change articles or materials to a ‘different state or
thing.’ We do not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet
the requirements of our prior precedents.;
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 n.9 (1978)
The statutory definition of ‘process’ is broad. An argument can be made,
however, that this Court has only recognized a process as within the statutory
definition when it either was tied to a particular apparatus or operated to change
materials to a ‘different state or thing.’ As in Benson, we assume that a valid
process patent may issue even if it does not meet one of these qualifications of
our earlier precedents. (citations omitted)).
251
Id. at 37–42 (quoting Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366, 382 (1909) (“[T]he statute
. . . secures to inventors the right of protection; and it is not the province of the courts to so limit the
statute as to deprive meritorious inventors of its benefits.”); Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 318 (“Congress is
free to amend § 101 . . . [b]ut, until Congress takes such action, this Court must construe the language
of § 101 as it is.”)).
252
Id. at 39–40 (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739
(2002) (“Fundamental alterations in these rules risk destroying the legitimate expectations of inventors
in their property.”)).
253
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 241, at 40–42 (arguing that certain criticisms of business
method patents illustrate problems applying rules of novelty, obviousness, and specification rather than
§ 101) (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112). For example, petitioners note prior disconcertion from the
Court that patents for business methods could be overly vague, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC,
246
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Moreover, petitioners pointed out that not only is § 101 broad, but also that
business methods are expressly recognized in § 273.254 Within § 273, Congress
crafted a defense to actions alleging the infringement of patents for methods where
“method” is defined as a “method of doing or conducting business.” 255 Therefore,
petitioners argued that because the Federal Circuit’s machine-or-transformation
test has been interpreted as a threat to existing business method patents, 256 then §
273 would be improperly rendered superfluous as a defense without any
concomitant threat257 and thereby inharmonious relative to § 101258 if the machineor-transformation test is allowed to stand.259
Instead of the machine-or-transformation test, petitioners posited that the
proper § 101 test annunciated by the Court must be the practical application test.260
The practical application test states that although abstract ideas, laws of nature, and
natural phenomena are not within the limits of § 101, a practical application of
those principles would be.261 This position is supported with Supreme Court
precedent dating back some 150 years, 262 and continued into the present. 263
547 U.S. 388, 397 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring), and argue that this problem should not be remedied
with the broad-scoped § 101, but is best dealt with under the statutory provisions regarding patent
specifications, which require “a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of
making and using it, in . . . full, clear, concise, and exact terms,” under 35 U.S.C. § 112.
254
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 241, at 29–37.
255
Id. at 29 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 273).
256
Id. at 33–34 (quoting CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1081
& n.16 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
Although the majority declined [to] say so explicitly, Bilski’s holding suggests a
perilous future for most business method patents. . . . The closing bell may be
ringing for business method patents, and their patentees may find they have
become . . . [just like] shareholder[s] left holding shares of worthless stocks.)
257
Id. at 34 (“Under the mandatory application of the machine-or-transformation test, § 273 would
provide a meaningless defense to the infringement of a class of patents that cannot exist.”).
258
Id. at 29 (quoting FTC v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 389 (1959) (“[I]f possible, all parts
[of a statute should fit] into a[] harmonious whole.”); Davis v. Mich. Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803,
809 (1989) (“It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read
in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”)). Further, petitioners
analogized harmonizing §§ 101 and 273 with how the Court had previously rationalized the patenteligibility of plant patents under § 101 by reference to 35 U.S.C. § 119. Id. at 34–37 (citing J.E.M. Ag
Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001)).
259
Id. at 34 (“That cannot be what Congress intended, and the Federal Circuit’s failure to address
this conflict between its decision and the clear legislative intent expressed through the adoption of § 273
warrants reversal.”).
260
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 241, at 42–52.
261
Id. at 42.
262
Id. at 43–46 (quoting O’Reilley v. Morse, 15 How. (56 U.S.) 62, 119 (1854)
Whoever discovers that a certain useful result will be produced, in any art,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, by the use of certain means, is
entitled to a patent for it. . . . It makes no difference . . . whether the effect is
produced by chemical agency or combination; or by the application of
discoveries or principles in natural philosophy known or unknown before his
invention; or by machinery acting altogether upon mechanical principles.)
263
Id. (citing Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880); The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1 (1888);
New Process Fermentation Co. v. Maus, 122 U.S. 413 (1887); Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp.
of Am., 306 U.S. 86 (1939); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948); Diamond
v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981)). Petitioners also
asserted that the Federal Circuit has followed the practical application standard. Id. at 53 (citing In re
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Moreover, petitioners differentiated the evolution of the American patent system
rather than paralleling it with English patent law, specifying that the English
system began as a means to promote manufacturing industry while the American
patent system markedly broke from that practice by allowing patents for a wide
variety of human discoveries.264
Under the practical application test, petitioners alleged the Bilski patent to be
patent-eligible under § 101.265 First, petitioners asserted that all the patent claims
fall within the § 101 category of processes because they describe a method for
hedging financial risk associated with commodities transactions. 266 Petitioners
then argued that the process of hedging is not an impermissible abstract idea
because, rather than merely attempting to patent the abstract business concept of
hedging, the claimed method is particularized with regard to the parties involved in
the commodities trading and with regard to the weather-oriented aspect of the
trading.267 Finally, the patent arguably satisfied § 101 strictures because the
described mathematical formula itself was not claimed, but the formula was put to
practical application to determine a certain price within the useful process of
hedging financial risk through weather-related commodities trading.268
b. Brief for the Respondent
The Brief for the Respondent is broken into three main arguments. 269
Respondent began by asserting that only industrial and technological processes,
not methods of organizing human activity, fall within the protection § 101
offers.270 Next, the respondent argued that the scope of § 101 is not expanded by §
273.271 Hinged upon the preceding arguments, respondent lastly noted that the
Federal Circuit correctly denied statutory eligibility for the Bilski patent under §
101.272
While respondent’s first main argument presented a mode of § 101 analysis
parallel to that found in the Federal Circuit’s en banc opinion, respondent treaded
further in countering a variety of petitioners’ arguments. 273 In order to support
congressional intent that § 101 is broad without encompassing methods of
organizing human activity, respondent pointed to the plain statutory text and
argued with support from Supreme Court precedent, 274 support from historical

Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group,
Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998); AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir.
1999)).
264
Id. at 47–52.
265
Id. at 52–59.
266
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 241, at 55–56.
267
Id. at 57–58.
268
Id. at 58–59.
269
Brief for the Respondent at III–IV, Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964, 2009 WL 3070864 (U.S. filed
Sept. 25, 2009).
270
Id. at 11–46.
271
Id. at 46–51.
272
Id. at 51–55.
273
See id. at 11–46.
274
Id. at 11–15 (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974); Lab. Corp. of

2010

DUCK, DUCK, BILSKI

363

definition,275 and support from English patent law. 276 Generally countering
petitioners’ arguments, respondent presented the following: (1) that the
congressional scope of “anything under the sun that is made by man” only includes
machines and manufactures;277 (2) that “[t]he machine-or-transformation test
accommodates evolving technology” rather than stilling modern advancements; 278
and (3) that the § 101 rubric advanced by petitioners cannot be proper. 279
Regarding petitioners’ § 273 argument, the respondent characterized
petitioners’ analysis as improper, conceding that while § 273 prevents actions for
infringement of business methods, that provision does not protect methods for
organizing human activity.280 Respondent asserted that § 273 protects against
business method infringement suits relating to business methods arising out of any
of the four subject matter categories within § 101.281 Moreover, respondent
contended that petitioners’ analogy to a similar plant patent-eligibility issue was
misplaced because the PTO has historically sought judicial approval regarding how
to treat process patents unlike the inferred congressional approval for the validity
of plant patents.282
Before calling for affirmation of the Federal Circuit’s decision, respondent
analyzed the facts surrounding the Bilski patent under the machine-ortransformation test in similar fashion as the Federal Circuit had. 283 Respondent
emphasized that the addition of a computer used to perform the mathematical
calculations involved in the patent claims would “not [be] central to the purpose of
the method invented by the applicant” and therefore patent-ineligible as
“insignificant extra-solution activity.”284 As an additional ground for ruling the
Bilski claims patent-ineligible, respondent proposed the claims would “‘pre-empt
any application of the fundamental concept of hedging and mathematical
calculations inherent in hedging consumption’ risk” for lack of meaningful claim

Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 127 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal
of a writ of certiorari)).
275
Brief for the Respondent, supra note 269, at 16–19 (citing 1 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)).
276
Id. at 19–25 (arguing that the American patent system elaborates upon, rather than breaks away
from, the historical English practice issuing patents primarily for technological or industrial processes).
However, respondent conceded that there were some English patents on methods of organizing human
activity. Id. at 20 n.5.
277
Id. at 25–36. Specifically, respondent noted the congressional statement that “anything under
the sun that is made by man” was tempered by the subsequent language reading, “is not necessarily
patentable under [§ 101] unless the conditions of the title are fulfilled.” Id. at 28. Respondent
interpreted one condition of the title through “the ‘commonsense’ cannon . . . [that] ‘a word is given
more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is associated.’” Id. at 26. This
interpretaion enabled respondent to argue that the other § 101 categories of machine, manufacture, and
compositions of matter restricted the scope of § 101 processes to those of an industrial or technological
vintage. Id. at 26–27.
278
Id. at 36–44.
279
Id. at 44–46.
280
Id. at 46–49.
281
Brief for the Respondent, supra note 269, at 49.
282
Id. at 49–50; see supra note 258.
283
Brief for the Respondent, supra note 269, at 51–55.
284
Id. at 52–53.
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delineation – an intolerable attempt to patent an abstract idea.285
c. Reply Brief for Petitioners
The Reply Brief for Petitioners elaborated upon four arguments that had
developed during the course of litigation. Petitioners’ maintained that upholding
the technology limitation on process patents through the machine-ortransformation test would be improper.286 Second, petitioners confronted the
respondent’s arguments that § 273 broadened the scope of § 101 and that the
machine-or-transformation test embodied the scope of § 101. 287 The practical
application test, alongside other Patent Act limitations, was supported within the
third argument.288 Finally, petitioners asserted pitfalls within the machine-ortransformation framework as illustrated by respondent’s analysis of petitioners’
arguments.289
B. Broader Impact
1. Effect on Business Methods, Computer Programs, and
Biotechnology
Bilski’s relationship with business method patents is perhaps most
obvious,290 yet the total effect the Federal Circuit decision will have is fairly
elusive.291 Ambiguity stems from the court’s mandate that business method
patents not be categorically excluded under § 101,292 coupled with the declination
to elaborate on the contours of the machine-or-transformation test beyond what the
facts required.293 For example, a patent applicant claiming a business method has
very little guidance on whether the business method is sufficiently tied to a
particular machine, whether any physical object qualifies as a particular
machine,294 or whether the involvement of the machine is “insignificant post285

Id. at 53–54.
Id. at 3–20.
287
Id. at 20–24.
288
Id. at 24–27.
289
Brief for the Respondent, supra note 269, at 27–28.
290
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (identifying the business method at issue,
namely “[a] method for managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by a commodity
provider at a fixed price”).
291
See Scott Bain, Patently Undecided: The Bilski Case, 26 INFO. TODAY 2 (2009) (“[T]he court’s
lengthy attempt to enunciate the new, proper standard, along with exceptions, leaves much to be argued
in future cases. Indeed, it seems that the real winners in the Bilski decision are the patent lawyers who
will battle over the further contours of the law and not the investors in software and business ventures
who were seeking more certainty.”).
292
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 960 (citing State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
at 1375–76)).
293
Id. at 962 (“We leave to future cases the elaboration of the precise contours of machine
implementation[.]”).
294
Id. (“We leave to future cases . . . the answers to particular questions, such as whether or when
recitation of a computer suffices to tie a process claim to a particular machine.”). In In re Ferguson, the
Federal Circuit defined “machine” as a “concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices and
combination of devices.” See supra note 227 and accompanying text. However, the Federal Circuit did
286
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solution” activity.295
Similarly vague is the effect Bilski will have on computer program
processes.296 Again, ambiguity stems from the Federal Circuit’s refusal to
elaborate on the contours of the machine-or-transformation test beyond what the
facts required.297 To exemplify, a patent applicant claiming a process carried out
by a particular computer program on a particular computer would have little
guidance upon whether the computer would suffice the machine branch of the §
101 inquiry,298 or whether the computer would create a mere field-of-use
limitation.299 This applicant would also have little guidance on whether the
particular computer program must also be embodied on a specific medium. 300
Bilski’s § 101 precedent further casts a shadow of ambiguity over the field of
biotechnology.301 For instance, a patent applicant claiming a method of collecting
data about a person’s organs and transforming the “raw data” into a visual
representation of numbers thereafter analyzed to detect abnormalities requiring
medical attention is left in the dark regarding patent-eligibility.302 To the extent
innovative medical diagnostic methods can be characterized as “an inquiry of the
extent of the proposed correlation between vaccines and chronic disorders,” it
appears that the Federal Circuit would find such methods patent-ineligible as
natural phenomena.303 However, diagnostic processes are probably patent-eligible
as long as those methods require the transformative administration of drugs to a
human body.304
2. Effect on Trade Secret Consideration
The term “trade secret” has been defined as follows:
A formula, process, device, or other business information that is kept confidential
to maintain an advantage over competitors; information—including a formula,
not explain how that definition excludes a human brain from being a “concrete thing” in light of the
statement that “a claimed process wherein all of the process steps may be performed entirely in the
human mind is obviously not tied to any machine.” Bilski, 545 F.3d at 961 n.26.
295
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1015 (Rader, J., dissenting) (“[T]his opinion propagates unanswerable
questions: . . . . What constitutes [insignificant] ‘extra-solution activity’?”).
296
See Bain, supra note 291; Bilski, 545 F.3d at 998 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (stating the majority
failed to elucidate one of the “thorniest issues in the patent [eligibility] thicket. . . . [T]he extent to
which computer software . . . constitute[s] statutory subject matter.”).
297
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962 (“We leave to future cases the elaboration of the precise contours of
machine implementation . . . .”).
298
See supra notes 223–25 and accompanying text.
299
See Ex parte Halligan, No. 2008-1588, 2008 WL 4998541, at *1–2, *13–14 (B.P.A.I. Nov. 24,
2008); Ex parte Gutta, No. 2008-3000, 2009 WL 112393, at *1–3 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 15, 2009).
300
See Ex parte Noguchi, No. 2008-1231, 2008 WL 4968270, at *5–7 (B.P.A.I. Nov. 20, 2008); Ex
parte Cornea-Hasegan, No. 2008-4742, 2009 WL 86725, at *1, *6 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 13, 2009).
301
See, e.g., Christopher M. Holman, Applying Bilski to Biotechnology and the Life Sciences,
PATENTLY-O, Nov. 4, 2008, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2008/11/applying-bilski.html.
302
See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1015 (Rader, J., dissenting) (“[T]his opinion propagates unanswerable
questions: . . . . When is a ‘representative’ of a physical object sufficiently linked to that object to
satisfy the transformation test?”).
303
See supra notes 214–17 and accompanying text.
304
See supra notes 231–36 and accompanying text.
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pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process—that (1)
derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally
known or readily ascertainable by others who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use, and (2) is the subject of reasonable efforts, under the
circumstances, to maintain its secrecy. 305

Augmenting this definition, trade secrets can be understood as relatives of
patents.306 However, trade secrets are broader in scope because protection of the
asset is governed only by the ability of the owner to maintain secrecy whereas
patent protection is defined relatively narrowly by the Patent Act. 307 Accordingly,
inventors may choose to protect their processes or methods through the use of
trade secrets rather than patents. Regarding business methods, computer programs
and biotechnology, inventors expecting Bilski to foreclose their ability to obtain
patents will protect their inventions with trade secrets so long as the specific
inventions can practically be kept secret.
3. Effect on Patent Examination
Patent examiners who evaluate patent applications for, among other things,
patent-eligibility under § 101 must meet various requirements set by the PTO. 308
Persons applying to become patent examiners “bear the burden of showing the
requisite scientific and technical training.”309 Applicants cannot meet this burden
by demonstrating they have taken “courses in management, business
administration and operations research; courses on how to use computer software;
courses directed to data management and management information systems.” 310
However, Bilski specifically declined to categorically exclude business method
patents from protection under § 101.311 It is reasonable to assume that inventors
will submit patent applications dealing with business concepts for examination by
examiners who will be unable to properly evaluate the patent application. If the
issuance of higher quality patents is desired,312 the PTO must ensure that patent
examiners are skilled in the areas related to § 101 subject matter, including
business.
4. Effect on Deference to the Federal Circuit
The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals. 313 This
305

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added).
MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.18, at 516 (1994).
307
See id.
308
See General Requirements Bulletin for Admission to the Examination for Registration to
Practice in Patent Cases Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office (2008),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/oed/grb.pdf.
309
Id. at 4.
310
Id. at 7.
311
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
312
PATRICK LEAHY, THE PATENT REFORM ACT OF 2007, S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 3 (2008),
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_reports&docid=f:
sr259.pdf.
313
28 U.S.C. §§ 1292, 1295 (2000).
306
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authority enables the Federal Circuit to be a specialized court that adeptly handles,
among other matters, highly complex patent cases that might otherwise cause
undue conflict among the various United States Courts of Appeals. 314 Resultantly,
a circuit split that might influence the Supreme Court’s decision to review a case
regarding a patent matter cannot occur. Abrogating three of its own and three of
its predecessor courts’ decisions en banc in Bilski and drawing three dissenting
opinions, the Federal Circuit created a situation where review from the Court
became necessary to resolve the apparent internal conflict at the Federal Circuit.315
Deference to the Federal Circuit should be given in order to allow the resolution of
increasingly complex matters, but certainly not to allow the court to “usurp[] the
legislative role.”316
VI. CONCLUSION
Even if the machine-or-transformation test eventually achieved laudable
results such as enhancing patent quality, the test leaves a multitude of open-ended
questions that belie an entirely reasonable interpretation of the Patent Act, Federal
Circuit case law, and Supreme Court precedent.317 Moreover, such open-ended
questions inject uncertainty into a patent system that is already experiencing
Without explaining the machine prong and leaving the
turbulence.318
transformation prong fairly unrefined, 319 it is not at all clear why the majority held
that the machine-or-transformation test was a better means of rejecting the claims
at issue rather than employing the principle that claims for abstract ideas are
patent-ineligible.320
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See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 1 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 11.
See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 958–60.
316
See id at 997 (Newman, J., dissenting).
317
See id. at 1010–11, 1015 (Mayer & Rader, JJ., dissenting) (explaining that the court failed to
clarify “three of the thorniest issues in the patentability thicket” and “propagate[d] unanswerable
questions”).
318
See, e.g., PATRICK LEAHY, THE PATENT REFORM ACT OF 2007, S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 1–4
(2008), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_reports
&docid=f:sr259.pdf; PATRICK LEAHY, THE PATENT REFORM ACT OF 2009, S. REP. NO. 111-18, at 1–3
(2009), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_reports
&docid=f:sr018.pdf.
319
See supra notes 130–36 and accompanying text. If the machine-or-transformation test has been
the proper standard for determining patent eligibility since 1981, then one might expect more
elaboration upon the contours of the test. See id.
320
See Bilski, 545 F.3d at1011 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
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